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ALGORITHMIC PROBLEMS IN ENGEL GROUPS AND
CRYPTOGRAPHIC APPLICATIONS
DELARAM KAHROBAEI AND MARIALAURA NOCE
Abstract. The theory of Engel groups plays an important role in group
theory since they are closely related to the Burnside problems.
In this survey we consider several classical and novel algorithmic prob-
lems for Engel groups and propose several open problems. We study these
problems with a view towards applications to cryptography.
1. Introduction
In cryptography most common protocols (RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and ellip-
tic curve methods) depend on the structure of commutative groups and they
are related to the difficulty to solve integers factorization and discrete loga-
rithms. In 1994 Shor provided a quantum algorithm that solves these prob-
lems in polynomial time [53]. For this reason, researchers are motivated to
find alternative methods for constructing cryptosystems. One of them is based
on non-commutative cryptography, which does not operate over the integers.
Hence, for security reasons, in the last decade new cryptosystems and key ex-
change protocols based on non-commutative cryptographic platforms have been
developed.
The complexity of algorithmic problems have made available families of groups
as platform groups for cryptographic protocols. Among others, we mention braid
groups (using the conjugacy search problem [33]), polycyclic groups ([11] and
[21]), linear groups [7], and right-angled Artin groups ([14] and [15]). For this
reason, the employment of algorithmic group theoretic problems in cryptography
is an active area of research nowadays.
In this paper we will present the actual state of Engel-group based cryptog-
raphy. In particular, we investigate several group theoretic problems in Engel
groups, with a view towards their applications to cryptography via computa-
tional complexity. We are primarily motivated by the fact that some of these
group theoretic problems can be used for cryptographic purposes, such as au-
thentication schemes, secret sharing schemes, key exchange problems, and mul-
tilinear maps.
The study of Engel groups originates from the famous paper of Burnside in
1901 and it is closely related to the General Burnside Problem (in the reminder
GBP, for short) [9]. The General Burnside Problem asks if a finitely generated
torsion group is finite. The question whether a finitely generated (n-)Engel
group is nilpotent is the analogue of the GBP in the realm of Engel groups. In
the following, we refer to this question as the “Engel Burnside Problem”. Of
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course, every group that is locally nilpotent is an Engel group, but the converse
needs not to be true in general. The first main result on Engel groups is the
Theorem of Zorn which shows that any finite Engel group is nilpotent.
We recall that an element g of a given group G is said to be right Engel if for
every x ∈ G there exists an integer n = n(g, x) ≥ 1 such that [g, nx] = 1, where
the commutator [g, nx] is defined recursively by the rules [g, x] = g
−1gx and
[g,n x] = [g, x, n. . ., x] = [[g, x, n−1. . . , x], x]
if n > 1. Similarly, g is a left Engel element if the variable x appears on the
left. A group is said to be an Engel group if all its elements are right Engel
or, equivalently, left Engel. In a similar way, one can talk about bounded Engel
elements, with the condition that the integer n can be chosen independently of
x. A group G is n-Engel if for any x, y ∈ G we have [x,n y] = 1 for some n ∈ N.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give basic definitions
and properties of Engel groups. We provide some identities satisfied by n-Engel
groups, and, in particular, we survey known and open questions about the Engel
Burnside Problem. We conclude the section by describing Burnside groups since
we think that they have similar behaviour to Engel groups.
Section 3 is devoted to survey general problems and interesting properties in
the setting of Engel groups. We present the definition of degree of nilpotency
for finite and infinite groups and some useful results that show how one can
compute it. In addition, we give the definition of the growth rate and the
Discrete Logarithm Problem.
In Section 4 we introduce several group-theoretic decision problems including
the word, conjugacy, and isomorphism decision problem. We also describe the
power decision problem, the endomorphism decision problem, the n-th root
decision problem and the geodesic length decision problem. We present also
many search problems.
In Section 5 we describe a number of cryptosystems that have been built
around Engel groups. In particular, we present multilinear maps, a public key
based on 2-Engel groups and a digital signature based on 4-Engel groups. In
addition, we present two secret sharing schemes based on the efficiency of the
word problem, and a key protocol whose platform groups are free nilpotent p-
groups. Moreover, we survey the Learning Problem Homomorphism which uses
as platform group the Burnside groups of exponent 3 (that are, in particular,
2-Engel groups). We conclude the section by presenting the Discrete Logarithm
Problem in finite p-groups and the status of quantum algorithms.
The last Section 6 of the paper is devoted to survey the current status of
Engel groups in cryptography. We also include a list of open problems, which
we hope will guide researchers who wish to work in this field.
2. Background on Engel groups
2.1. Preliminaries. Let G be a group and let x1, x2, . . . be elements of G. We
define the commutator of weight n ≥ 1 recursively by the rule
[x1, . . . , xn] =
{
x1 if n = 1
[[x1, . . . , xn−1], xn] if n > 1,
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where [x1, x2] = x
−1
1 x
−1
2 x1x2 = x
−1
1 x
x2
1 . If x = x1 and y = x2 = · · · = xn+1, we
use the shorthand notation
[x, ny] = [x, y, n. . ., y].
In the following we recall the definition of Engel elements of a group.
Definition 1. Let G be a group and g ∈ G. We say that g is a right Engel
element if for any x ∈ G there exists n = n(g, x) ≥ 1 such that [g, nx] = 1.
If n can be chosen independently of x, then g is a right n-Engel element (or a
bounded right Engel element).
Similarly, g is a left Engel element if for any x ∈ G there exists n = n(g, x) ≥ 1
such that [x, ng] = 1. Again, if the choice of n is independent of x, then g is a
left n-Engel element (or a bounded left Engel element).
The sets of right and left Engel elements of G are denoted by R(G) and
L(G), respectively. Notice that R(G) and L(G) are invariant subsets under
automorphisms of G. Hence, for any g ∈ R(G) (resp. g ∈ L(G)) and any x ∈ G,
we have gx ∈ R(G) (resp. gx ∈ L(G)).
The following gives the iteration between right and left Engel elements.
Proposition 2 ([27]). Let G be a group. We have
R(G)−1 ⊆ L(G) and Rn(G)
−1 ⊆ Ln+1(G).
Notice also that in every 2-group, elements of order 2 are left Engel, as the
following proposition (it can be found, for example, in [49]) shows.
Proposition 3. Let G be group and let g ∈ G such that g2 = 1. Then for any
x ∈ G and any n ≥ 1:
[x, ng] = [x, g]
(−2)n−1 .
In particular, every involution in any 2-group is a left Engel element.
In the following we give definitions of Engel and n-Engel groups.
Definition 4. We say that G is an Engel group if G = R(G) or, equivalently,
G = L(G). Moreover, G is an n-Engel group if there exists n ≥ 1 such that
[x, ny] = 1, for all x, y ∈ G.
Of course every n-Engel group is Engel, and every nilpotent group of class n
is n-Engel. Also, there are nilpotent groups of class n that are not (n−1)-Engel.
An example is the group G = Cp ≀ Cp, that is the wreath product of two cyclic
groups of order a prime p. One can see that G is nilpotent of class p but not
a (p− 1)-Engel group (see Theorem 6.2 of [36]). Furthermore is not difficult to
construct n-Engel groups that are not nilpotent. Take for example a prime p
and consider the group G = Cp ≀ Cp∞, where Cp∞ is the Pru¨fer group. One can
prove that G is a (p+ 1)-Engel group but it is not nilpotent.
The main open question in the realm of Engel groups is whether every n-
Engel group is locally nilpotent. Hence, the Engel condition is more general than
nilpotency. Recall that a group G is locally nilpotent if each finitely generated
subgroup of G is nilpotent.
For n ≤ 4 every n-Engel group is locally nilpotent. Indeed, 1-Engel groups
are abelian. For n = 2, Levi proved that G is a 2-Engel group if and only if the
normal closure of an arbitrary element is abelian [35]. Moreover 2-Engel groups
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are nilpotent of class at most 3. For n = 3, Heineken proved that every 3-Engel
is locally nilpotent [28]. Finally, Havas and Vaughan-Lee [26] proved that every
4-Engel groups generated by d elements are nilpotent of class 4d. For n > 4 the
question is still open.
In some other classes of groups also being n-Engel implies locally nilpotency.
For example, any residually finite n-Engel group is locally nilpotent [58].
About Engel groups, as pointed out in the introduction, the question whether
every Engel group is locally nilpotent is the analogue of the General Burnside
Problem for Engel groups.
It is easy to check that every locally nilpotent group is Engel. The converse
is true in some classes of groups like finite groups (Zorn [59]), soluble groups
(Gruenberg [18]), groups with maximal condition (Baer [3]), linear groups ([55])
and some other classes of groups. Hence, in these cases the condition to being
Engel is equivalent to local nilpotency, but in general it is much weaker. Indeed,
the infinite p-group G = 〈x1 . . . , xr〉 constructed by Golod is a counterexample.
This group is Engel and it is such that every (r − 1)-generated subgroup is
nilpotent. So far, in the periodic case, Golod’s group is the only known example
of finitely generated Engel group that is not nilpotent.
2.2. Identities satisfied by n-Engel groups. In this section we present some
semigroup identities satisfied by n-Engel groups for n ≤ 4. We have the follow-
ing.
(1) In every 2-Engel group yx2y = xy2x.
(2) In every 3-Engel group
xy2xyx2y = yx2yxy2x and xy2xyxyx2y = yx2y2x2y2x.
(3) In every 4-Engel group we have
xy2xyx2y2x2yxy2xyx2yxy2x2y2xyx2y = yx2yxy2x2y2xyx2yxy2xyx2y2x2yxy2x.
For more information one can see [57] and [39].
Notice that, additionally, if a group is Engel and locally nilpotent one can
prove the following.
Theorem 5 ([10]). There exist positive integers m = m(n) and r = r(n) such
that any locally nilpotent n-Engel group satisfies
[xr, x1, . . . , xm] = 1.
2.3. Burnside groups. In this subsection, we present Burnside groups since
it seems that their behaviour is similar to the behaviour of the class of Engel
groups. Moreover, in Section 5.5 we present a protocol that uses Burnside groups
of exponent 3 as platform group.
Let Fm be a free group of rank m. The free Burnside group B(m,n) is
the group Fm/F
n
m, where F
n
m is the group generated by all the n-th powers of
elements of Fm. Therefore B(m,n) is the group in which the identity x
n =
1 holds and for this reason is the biggest group generated by m elements of
exponent n. The Burnside Problem asks if a finitely generated group of finite
exponent is finite, that is the same as asking whether the free Burnside groups
are finite.
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It is easy to prove that for any m the 2-group B(m, 2) is elementary abelian
and so finite. Burnside proved that also B(m, 3) is finite for any m. Levi and
van der Waerden in 1993 proved that if m ≥ 3 the Burnside group B(m, 3) is
finite and nilpotent of class 3. One can also prove that since B(m, 3) is a group
of exponent 3, then it is a 2-Engel group because of the following.
Proposition 6 (12.3.5 of [49]). A group of exponent 3 is a 2-Engel group.
In 1940, Sanov proved that also the group B(m, 4) is finite for every m. For
n = 5 the problem is still open. Although for some small values of n the Burnside
groups are finite, in 1968, Novikov and Adian proved that, in general, Burnside
groups need not to be finite. Indeed they showed that if m ≥ 2, and n is odd
and greater than 4381, then B(n,m) is infinite. This bound was improved later
by Adian which showed that n can be chosen odd and greater than or equal
to 665. With the same construction used to prove that these Burnside groups
are infinite, Novikov and Adian also proved that the word and the conjugacy
problems are decidable in Burnside groups, see [44].
3. Other properties and problems around Engel groups
In this section, we survey additional properties that can help us to the study of
Engel groups. In particular, we present the growth rate, the Discrete Logarithm
Problem for finite p-groups, and the degree of nilpotency.
3.1. Growth rate. Let G be a finitely generated group. The growth function
γ is
γ : N → R
n 7→ |{w ∈ G : l(w) ≤ n}|
where l(w) denotes the length of w. Since words are used as keys in group-
based cryptography, there is a natural relationship between the growth rate of
a group and the key space, that is the set of all possible keys. A fast growth
rate engenders a large key space, making an exhaustive search of this space
intractable. Notice that by a deep result of Gromov, if G is a finitely generated
group, then G has polynomial growth if and only if G is virtually nilpotent [17].
Moreover Golod Shafarevich groups have exponential growth [4].
3.2. The Discrete Logarithm Problem. Let G be a finite group. Given
x, y ∈ G, the Discrete Logarithm Problem (in the reminder DLP for short) is
to find a positive integer a such that xa = y (if it exists). Notice that this is
usually defined in the setting of cyclic groups because the Discrete Logarithm
exists for all elements and all nontrivial bases.
Notice that the DLP can be generalized to several components as follows.
Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) be a tuple of elements such that G = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉. Given
y ∈ G, the “generalized” DLP of y with respect to x is to find ai such that y can
be written uniquely as xa = (xa11 , . . . , x
an
n ) = y where 0 < ai < |xi| for every i.
For a survey on the topic see, for example, [45].
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3.3. Degree of n-nilpotency. In this subsection we present the definition of
degree of n-nilpotency and some related properties. This is a notion that mea-
sures how close is a group to being nilpotent of nilpotency class n. In particular,
this is a way to measure how close Engel groups are to being nilpotent. This
is relevant for us since some protocols work better using Engel (or nilpotent)
groups (see Section 5). In the following we provide two ways to compute the
degree of nilpotency of a group.
3.3.1. Degree of n-nilpotency of a finite group. In [41] the degree of n-nilpotency
(n ≥ 2) of a finite group G is defined as follows:
d(n)(G) =
|{(x1, · · · , xn+1) ∈ G
n+1 | [x1, · · · , xn+1] = 1}|
|G|n+1
.
For ease of notation write d(G) = d(1)(G). Clearly d(G) = 1 if and only if
the group G is abelian. In [22] Gustafson proved that if d(G) > 5/8, then G is
abelian. Moreover if d(G) > 1/2, then G is nilpotent [34].
In the following we present two upper bounds for the above definition of
n-nilpotency degree [12].
Theorem 7. Let G be a finite group which is not nilpotent of class at most n.
Then
d(n)(G) ≤
2n+2 − 3
2n+2
.
Theorem 8. Let G be a nontrivial finite group with trivial center. Then for
every n ≥ 1,
d(n)(G) ≤
2n − 1
2n
.
3.3.2. General definition. We conclude this section by pointing out that there
exists a more general definition of degree of nilpotency which holds also for
infinite groups.
Definition 9. [1] Let G be a group (not necessarily finite) generated by a finite
set X. The degree of n-nilpotency of G with respect to X is defined as follows:
dn,X(G) = lim sup
m→∞
|{x ∈ BX(m)
n+1 | [x1, . . . , xm] = 1}|
|BX(m)|n+1
,
where BX(m) is the ball of radius n centered at 1 on the Cayley graph of G
with respect to X.
Obviously, if the group G is finite then the above definition coincides with
the one given in Section 3.3.1. We finally remark that in [1] it has been proved
that the positivity of dn,X(G) does not depend on the generating set X.
4. Algorithmic problems
In this section we survey several decision problems in group theory. In partic-
ular, we summarize the status of the complexity of some algorithmic problems
in the context of Engel groups. In Section 5 we present cryptosystems whose
security depends on some of these problems.
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Notice also that, as pointed out in Section 2.1, every finitely generated n-
Engel group with n ≤ 4 is nilpotent. Then every result for nilpotent groups can
be applied to n-Engel groups for n ≤ 4.
4.1. Decision problems. From now on we let G be a group given by a pre-
sentation 〈X|R〉 and we understand that when we speak of elements of G these
are given as a product of generators in X±1.
The following three decision problems were introduced by Dehn in 1911. They
are defined as follows.
• Word Problem: For any g ∈ G, determine if g is the identity element of
G.
• Conjugacy Problem: For any x, y ∈ G, determine if x and y are conju-
gate.
• Isomorphism Problem: Let G and G′ be groups given by finite presen-
tations, determine if G is isomorphic to G′.
For polycyclic groups all three of the above problems are decidable (see [47],
[19], [16], [51], and for a survey on the topic see [21]).
For finitely generated nilpotent groups the word problem is solvable. Also,
finitely generated nilpotent groups are linear ([25]) and for linear groups the
word problem is solvable in logspace ([37]). Hence, the word problem for finitely
generated nilpotent groups is is solvable in (deterministic) logspace.
Furthermore, Blackburn in 1965 proved that the conjugacy problem is decid-
able as well [8].
The isomorphism problem is also known to be solvable for finitely generated
nilpotent groups [20]. Notice that, in contrast, the epimorphism problem is
undecidable for finitely generated nilpotent groups [48]. We record that the
epimorphism problem asks whether, given two finite presentations R1 and R2
of groups, there exists an algorithm which determines if the group with pre-
sentation R1 is a homomorphic image of the group defined by the presentation
R2.
4.1.1. Power decision problem. Let G be a finitely generated group. Given
x, y ∈ G, determine whether there exists n ∈ Z such that y = xn. Notice that
this is equivalent to deciding whether y ∈ 〈x〉, and thus is the analogue of the
Discrete Logarithm Problem (see Section 5.6). A generalization of the power
problem is the subgroup membership problem that can be stated as follows.
4.1.2. Subgroup membership decision problem. Let G be a group and H ≤ G.
The subgroup membership decision problem (also known as the generalized word
problem) asks for any g ∈ G if g ∈ H. The subgroup membership problem
is decidable for finitely generated nilpotent groups [2]. This problem can be
generalized to the rational subset membership problem. Recall that given a
group G, the class of rational subsets of G is the smallest class that contains
all finite subsets of G and that it is closed with respect to union, product and
taking the free monoid generated by a set (i.e. using the Kleene star operation).
The rational subset membership problem asks whether given a rational subset
H of G and an element g ∈ G, whether g ∈ H. In this case, nilpotent groups
have undecidable rational subgroup membership problem [38].
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4.1.3. The endomorphism decision problem. Let F be a free group and x ∈ F .
The endomorphism decision problem asks whether there exists an algorithm
that given y ∈ F decides if there exists an endomorphism φ of F sending x to
y. In nilpotent groups the endomorphism problem is undecidable [50].
4.1.4. The n-th root decision problem. For n ∈ N, an element x of a group G
is a n-th root of an element a if the equation xn = a has solution. Given an
element g ∈ G, the n-th root decision problem asks to determine if g has any
n-th root. Note that if the root of every element of G belongs to G, the group
is said to be complete.
We remark that if we take a group H under addition, this is the problem of
finding n-th roots is equivalent to saying that for any n ∈ N and every element
h ∈ H, the equation nx = h has at least one solution in H.
For some results about finding n-th roots in nilpotent groups see [57]. It seems
that finding square roots in Engel groups is a difficult problem (see Section 5.2.1
and Section 5.2.2).
4.1.5. Geodesic length decision problem. Let G = 〈X〉 be a group generated by
a set X. Denote with |w| the length of a word in the alphabet X±1, and with ρ
the canonical epimorphism of F (X) onto G, where F (X) denotes the free group
over the set X. The geodesic length lX(g) of an element g ∈ G with respect to
X is
lX(g) = min{|w| | w ∈ F (X), ρ(w) = g}.
We say that a word w ∈ F (X) is geodesic if |w| = lX(ρ(w)). Given a word w ∈
F (X), the geodesic length decision problem consists in, given a word w ∈ F (X),
to find lX(ρ(w)).
In [42] it is observed that for nilpotent groups this is a hard problem.
4.2. Search problems. In this section we survey some search problems. Sev-
eral protocols of non-commutative cryptography, like Ko-Lee and Anshel-Anshel-
Goldfeld, are based in part on the conjugacy search problem. For this reason
here we present, among others, the conjugacy search problem and some of its
variations.
As before, we let G be a group given by the presentation 〈X|R〉 and we agree
that when we refer to an element of G this is given as a product of generators
in X±1.
4.2.1. Word search problem. The word search problem is: given a finitely pre-
sented group G and an element g = 1 in G find a presentation of g as a product
of conjugates of defining relators and their inverses.
4.2.2. Conjugacy search problem. Let G be a group and a1, . . . an, b1, . . . bn ∈ G
where ai is conjugate to bi for i = 1, . . . , n. The multiple conjugacy search
problem is to find c ∈ G such that aci = bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. If n = 1 this reduces
to the conjugacy search problem.
In some cases, for example for polycyclic groups [11], the multiple conju-
gacy search problem reduces to the solvability of single (independent) conjugacy
search problem. In general, for finitely generated polyciclic groups the conju-
gacy search problem can be solved by recursively enumerating the conjugates of
the elements taken in consideration [54].
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4.2.3. Power conjugacy search problem. The power conjugacy search problem
asks to find for some x, y ∈ G, an element g ∈ G, and n ∈ N such that xn = yg.
Note that for n = 1 this reduces to the standard conjugacy search problem,
whereas if g is the identity in the group this reduces to the power (search)
problem.
5. Applications to cryptography
In this section we present some applications of Engel groups to cryptography.
We first survey some cryptosystems based on n-Engel groups such as a public
key, a digital signature, two secret sharing schemes and multilinear maps. We
present the protocol used, the ideal platform group, and some security assump-
tions. We conclude this section presenting the Discrete Logarithm Problem
(DLP for short) in finite p-groups (that are nilpotent groups, so in particular
Engel groups) and providing the actual status of quantum algorithms.
5.1. Multilinear maps. In this subsection we first define multilinear maps and
then we provide some applications. For more information, see [32].
Definition 10. Let n be a positive integer and G an arbitrary group. A map
e : Gn → G is said to be a n-linear map (or a multilinear map) if for any
g1, . . . , gn,∈ G and any a1, . . . , an ∈ Z we have
e(ga11 , . . . , g
an
n ) = e(g1, . . . , gn)
a1···an .
Moreover, we say that the map e is non-degenerate if there exists g ∈ G such
that e(g, . . . g) 6= 1.
Let now G be a nilpotent group of class n > 1 and g1, . . . , gn ∈ G. One can
easily prove by induction on n that for any a1, . . . , an ∈ Z the following identity
holds:
(1) [ga11 , . . . , g
an
n ] = [g1, . . . , gn]
∏n
i=1 ai .
Hence if G is nilpotent, the map e
e : Gn → G
(g1, . . . , gn) 7→ [g1, . . . , gn]
is a multilinear map. In addition, if we fix x ∈ G, we can construct another
multilinear map f given by
f : G(n−1) → G
(g1, . . . , gn−1) 7→ [x, g1, . . . , gn−1].
Notice that we want the multilinear map to be non-degenerate. This is the case
if we assume that G is not (n− 1)-Engel. Indeed, in this condition, there exists
g ∈ G such that [x,(n−1) g] 6= 1, which implies that f is non-degenerate.
5.1.1. Protocol. Let G be a nilpotent group of class n+ 1 which is not n-Engel
(n ≥ 1). Then there exist elements x, g ∈ G such that [x,n g] 6= 1. The group G
is public. We have n+1 users A1, . . . An+1 that wish to agree on a shared secret
key. Each user Aj selects a private integer aj 6= 0, computes g
aj , and sends it
to the other users. Then we are in the following situation:
• The user A1 computes [x
a1 , ga2 , . . . gan+1 ].
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• For j = 2, . . . , n, the user Aj computes [x
aj , ga1 , . . . , gaj−1 , gaj+1 , . . . , gan+1 ].
• The user An+1 computes [x
an+1 , ga1 , . . . gan ].
Since (1) holds in all nilpotent groups, all elements computed by the users
are equal to k = [x,n g]
∏n+1
j=1
aj . This is the shared key.
5.2. Two cryptosystems based on n-th root problem in n-Engel groups.
In this section we present two cryptosystems in n-Engel groups proposed in [57].
5.2.1. A public key based on 2-Engel groups. A satellite generates some data
from a 2-Engel group. Alice and Bob choose two elements x and y as their
secret keys, respectively. Then Alice sends x2 to Bob and Bob sends y2 to Alice.
As pointed out in Section 2.2, in any 2-Engel group it holds the semigroup
identity xy2x = yx2y. Then Alice and Bob agree on a key. One could extend
this scheme to other n-Engel groups, since there are similar relations in them
as well (see, for example Equation 5).
5.2.2. A digital signature based on 4-Engel groups. Consider a 4-Engel group,
which is nilpotent and satisfies the following semigroup law (see the last part of
Section 2 and Section 2.2):
xy2xyx2y2x2yxy2xyx2yxy2x2y2xyx2y = yx2yxy2x2y2xyx2yxy2xyx2y2x2yxy2x.
The idea to make a digital signature is as follows. Suppose x and y are private
and x2, y2, xy2x, and xy2x2y2x are public. The public key is x2 and the
signature is xy2x and xy2x2y2x. The verifier knows y, so he has to verify both
the semigroup identity.
5.2.3. Platfrom group and security. The underlying group could be combined
by a finite group in which square root is hard, for example Z∗pq, with p, q prime
numbers.
The security of these digital signatures lies on the fact that the complexity of
finding square root in 2-Engel and 4-Engel groups. It seems that this is a hard
problem [43].
5.3. Secret sharing based on the word problem in Engel groups. In
this section we present two secret sharing schemes based on the word problem
proposed by Habeeb-Kahrobaei-Shpilrain [24]. Both of them are based on the
efficiency of the word problem and we will use them with (n-)Engel nilpotent
groups.
We recall that a (t, n)-threshold secret sharing is a scheme in which a secret
is distributed among n participants in a way that the secret can be recovered
only if at least t of them combine their shares. We present two secret sharing
schemes. The first one (Scheme 1) is a (n, n)-threshold scheme and so the
participants must get together to recover the secret. The second one (Scheme
2) is a (t, n)-threshold scheme that is a combination of Shamir’s scheme [52] and
the group-theoretic scheme proposed in Section 3 of [24] and presented below.
In both of them we denote a generic participant of the protocol with Pi, with
1 ≤ i ≤ n. We also suppose that the dealer and the participants at the beginning
are able to communicate over secure channels and then they communicate over
open channels.
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5.3.1. Scheme 1. The following is an (n, n)-threshold scheme. The dealer:
• Distributes a k-column of bits C = (c1, c2, . . . , ck)
T.
• Distributes C among n participants in such a way that the column can
be reconstructed only if all participants combine their information.
A set X = {x1, . . . , xm} of generators is public. Then the protocol is as follows.
(1) The dealer uses a secure channel to assign to each participant Pj a set of
words Rj in the alphabet X
±1 such that each group Gj = 〈x1, . . . , xm |
Rj〉 has word problem solvable in polynomial time.
(2) The dealer splits the column C in
∑n
j=1Cj mod 2. These are secret
shares to be distributed to the n participants.
(3) The dealer distributes words w1j, . . . wkj in the generators x1, . . . xm over
an open channel to each participant Pj , with 1 ≤ j ≤ n. The choice of
the words is such that wij 6= 1 in Gj if cij = 0 and wij = 1 in Gj if
cij = 1, where cij is the i-th entry of Cj .
(4) Each participant Pj check for any i if wij = 1 in the group Gj or not.
(5) Now each participant constructs Cj = (c1j , c2j , . . . , ckj)
T of 0’s and 1’s
(cij = 1 if wij = 1 in Gj , and 0 otherwise).
(6) The secret is built by putting together the vector sum
∑n
j=1Cj mod 2.
5.3.2. Scheme 2. In this case we present a (t, n)-threshold scheme in which the
secret is an element x ∈ Zp, for p a prime number. The dealer:
• Chooses a polynomial f of degree t− 1 such that f(0) = x.
• Determines integers yi = f(i) mod p for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
• Distributes every yi to the correspondent participant Pi.
We now consider a set X = {x1, . . . , xm} of generators, which is public. In
addition, we assume that the integer x and every yi can be written as k-bit
columns. Now we are ready to present the scheme, that reads as follows.
(1) The dealer distributes over a secure channel to each participant Pj a set
of relators Rj such that each group Gj = 〈x1, . . . , xm | Rj〉 has efficiently
solvable word problem.
(2) The dealer then distributes over open channels k-columns of the form
bj = (b1j , b2j , . . . , bkj)
T, (where 1 ≤ j ≤ n) of words in x1, . . . , xm to
each participant. The bij are chosen such that if we replace them by
bits, the resulting bit column represents the integer yj. Note that we
use “1” if bij = 1 in the group Gj and “0” otherwise.
(3) For any word bij , the participant Pj checks whether or not bij = 1 in
the group Gj . Then Pj obtains a binary representation of the number
yj, and therefore Pj recovers yj.
(4) Each participant now has a point f(i) = yi of the polynomial. Using
polynomial interpolation, any t participants can now recover the poly-
nomial f . Whence they obtain the secret x = f(0).
If t ≥ 3, Step 4 can be changed in a way that the participants do not have to
reveal their individual shares to each other if they do not want to. For more
details about how to arrange this, an interested reader can see [24].
5.3.3. Platform group. For Scheme 1 and Scheme 2, we propose finitely pre-
sented nilpotent Engel groups that, being nilpotent, have efficiently solvable
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word problem (see the discussion in Section 4.1). For example, one can use n-
Engel groups with n = 2, 3, 4 or an Engel group that is linear, solvable or finite
(and hence nilpotent).
5.4. A key protocol based on semidirect products of groups. In this
section we present a key protocol based on semidirect products of groups (or
semigroups). This protocol can be based on any group, but we present an
application using free nilpotent p-groups where p is a sufficiently large prime
p proposed by Kahrobaei and Shpilrain in [31]. Note that there are several
protocols based on semidirect products of groups, such as a public key exchange
[23].
5.4.1. Protocol. Let G be a group (or a semigroup) and choose public g ∈ G
and ϕ ∈ Aut(G) (or End(G)). Alice chooses a private m ∈ N while Bob chooses
a private n ∈ N. Alice and Bob are going to work with elements of the form
(g, ϕr), where g ∈ G and r ∈ N. Recall that the multiplication of two elements
of this form is as follows:
(g, ϕr)(h, ϕs) = (ϕs(g)h, ϕr+s).
Now we present a key exchange protocol similar to the Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change.
• Alice computes
(g, ϕ)m = (ϕm−1(g) · · ·ϕ2(g)ϕ(g)g, ϕm)
and sends the first component a = φm−1(g) · · ·ϕ2(g)ϕ(g)g of the pair to
Bob.
• Bob computes
(g, ϕ)n = (ϕn−1(g) · · ·ϕ2(g)ϕ(g)g, ϕn)
and sends the first component b = ϕn−1(g) · · ·ϕ2(g)ϕ(g)g of the pair to
Alice.
• Alice computes
(b, x)(a, ϕm) = (ϕm(b)a, xϕm).
Her key is KA = ϕ
m(b)a.
• Bob computes
(a, y)(b, ϕn) = (ϕn(a)b, yϕn).
His key is KB = ϕ
n(a)b.
The shared secret key is K = KA = KB = since
(b, x)(a, ϕm) = (a, y)(b, ϕn) = (g, ϕ)m+n.
5.4.2. Platform groups. We denote with γc(G) the normal subgroup of G gen-
erated by all the elements of the form [y1, . . . , yc]. Consider now Fm the free
group on x1, . . . , xm. The factor group Fm/γc+1(Fm) is the free nilpotent group
of nilpotency class c.
The group suggested as platform group for the protocol described above is
G = Fm/F
p2
m γc+1(Fm)
ALGORITHMIC PROBLEMS IN ENGEL GROUPS 13
that is a nilpotent p-group and hence a finite group whose order depends on
c,m and p. The suggested values of c and m are small numbers, for example
c = 2 or c = 3 to make the computation efficient. Conversely, the value of p
should be sufficiently large to make it secure to a linear algebra attack.
5.5. Burnside groups of exponent 3 and the learning homomorphism
problem. The learning with errors (LWE) problem was introduced by Regev
in [46], and has become one of the most known problems in lattice-based cryp-
tography. It has been used to construct several cryptosystems, and it is believed
to be hard even for quantum computers.
Informally speaking, the problem of learning with error is to deduce a partic-
ular function by sampling the input/output behavior if some of the outputs are
incorrect. For more information one can see [6].
In the following, we define the Learning Homomorphim Problem with Noise
(LHN, for short) that is a generalization of the LWE. We will denote the set of
homomorphisms from a group G to a group H with Hom(G,H).
Definition 11. Let ϕ ∈ Hom(G,H), where G and H are finitely generated
groups, and let g1, . . . gm ∈ G. Also, let α and β be probability distributions
over G and H, respectively. Let Ψ be the probability distribution over G ×H
which assigns to each tuple of the form (g, ϕ(g)h) the probability Prob(g ∼ α)
and Prob(h ∼ β) and the rest of tuples from G ×H are assigned a probability
of 0.
We say that an algorithm solves the LHN with noise if for any ϕ : G → H,
the algorithm is able to learn ϕ given a set of samples from the distribution Ψ
with high probability. For the purpose of this paper we omit the definition of
“learning with high probability given a set of samples”. For a detailed reference
on this, see [6] and [13].
5.5.1. Protocol, platform groups and security assumptions. In [13] the authors
employed for the first time properties of Burnside groups in cryptography. In
particular, they introduced the Learning Burnside Homomorphisms with Noise
(B-LHN), which uses for computational purposes only surjective homomor-
phisms in contrast to the general definition of LHN [6].
To avoid technicality, we omit the description of the protocol used for this
problem. We address the reader to pp. 10-11 of [6].
We want to underline that as platform group for the B-LHN problem, the
authors employed the Burnside groups of exponent 3, that are, in particular,
2-Engel groups. The security of this protocol is based on the computational
hardness of B-LHN (see Theorem 2 of [13]).
5.6. The Discrete Logarithm Problem in finite p-groups. Sutherland
studied the DLP in some finite abelian p-groups [56], and in a series of papers by
Mahalanobis, the DLP has been studied for finite p-groups of nilpotency class
2 [40]. Solving the DLP in finite p-groups of larger class is an interesting ques-
tion. One, for example, can consider semidirect product of cyclic p-groups of
well-defined orders, to make a nilpotent group and then computing the Discrete
Logarithm in each factor.
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5.7. Quantum algorithms. We conclude this section of applications by pre-
senting the status of quantum algorithms in cryptography. In 2015 the National
Security Agency announced plans to replace all deployed cryptographic proto-
cols with quantum secure protocols. A quantum computer is able to perform
integer factorization and solve the DLP in finite cyclic groups in polynomial
time.
In [5] it has been explored the application of quantum algorithms to group
theory. In particular, from a group theoretic point of view, Shor’s algorithm can
be seen as the hidden subgroup problem in finite cyclic groups. We recall that
a subgroup H of a group G is hidden by a function f from G to a set X if it
is constant over all cosets of H, and takes distinct values on distinct cosets. In
other words, for any g1, g2 ∈ G, f(g1) = f(g2) if and only if g1H = g2H. Given
a hidden subgroup H, the hidden subgroup problem asks to find a generating
set for H using information from evaluations of f via an oracle (for a survey on
the topic, see [29]). In [30] the complexity of quantum algorithms for the HSP
for certain semidirect product of certain finite p-groups, for p a prime has been
considered.
6. Conclusion and open questions
In this paper we have presented the current state of Engel group-based cryp-
tography. We have begun with a study of algorithmic properties of Engel groups,
and we have also seen that there are a variety of key exchanges, digital signature
systems, and secret sharing schemes for which an Engel (or nilpotent) group is
an appropriate choice of platform group. As we have seen throughout the paper,
if on the one hand there has been some results about Engel groups and their
attendant cryptosystems over the last decade, on the other hand the majority
of computational complexity and algorithmic questions remain unanswered.
We collect some open problems below with the hope of stimulating interest
in their solutions.
We start by pointing out that since Engel groups are a generalization of
nilpotent groups, in the case in which the algorithmic problems presented in
in Section 4 are decidable for nilpotent groups, we ask whether the same holds
specially if the group is n-Engel. Also, since some problems are undecidable for
nilpotent groups (take, for example, the rational subgroup membership problem
and the endomorphism problem) we ask:
(1) Is the rational subgroup membership problem undecidable for Engel
groups?
(2) Is the endomorphism problem undecidable for Engel groups?
In addition, we propose the following questions related also to the complexity
of some algorithmic problems presented in Section 4.
(3) Determine if the following algorithmic problems are decidable and if yes,
find the complexity:
• The word problem.
• The (power) conjugacy problem.
• The geodesic length problem.
(4) What about the search problems proposed in Section 4.2? For example,
if G is an Engel group, and a1, . . . an, b1, . . . bn ∈ G where ai is conjugate
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to bi for i = 1, . . . , n. Can we find c ∈ G such that a
c
i = bi (for 1 ≤
i ≤ n)? As a starting point, one can study the single conjugacy search
problem (i.e. the case n = 1).
In Section 5 we present several ideas of Engel-group based cryptography.
In particular, in Section 5.1, we present a protocol based on multilinear maps.
It is an open question the ideal platform of this scheme. Thus we ask the
following.
(5) What is an ideal platform group for the protocol proposed in Section
5.1?
In Section 5.2 we present some specific cryptosystems based on n-Engel
groups. It seems they are secure because they are based on the difficulty to
find square roots in n-Engel groups. Moreover, no platform groups are sug-
gested. Whence, we propose the following.
(6) What is an ideal platform group for the protocol proposed in Section
5.2.1 and Section 5.2.2, respectively?
(7) What is the complexity of the square root problem in n-Engel groups?
And for the n-root problem?
In view of Section 5.7, we conclude the paper with the following questions.
(8) Is the HSP solvable for Engel groups?
(9) Are there some Engel group-based cryptosystems resistant to quantum
algorithms? Note that this could be done either by analyzing the HSP for
Engel groups or showing the underlying security problem is NP-complete
or NP-hard.
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